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TRIAL BY JURY AND "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" IN
THE PHILIPPINES.
There are three cases pending in the Supreme Court of the
United States* on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands which have, not inappropriately, been designated as a
"second instalment of the Insular Cases." They involve constitu-
tional questions growing out of the administration of the Archipelago
of far-reaching consequence to the people of the islands and of much
interest to all who are following the development of the laws of our
new possessions.
The two questions raised in these cases are: First,
Does the right of trial by jury exist in the Philippines? and,
second,
Does the Philippine Government act which prohibits "double
jeopardy," repeal the law of procedure in force in the Philippines,
which gives the Government, as well as the accused, the right of
appeal in criminal cases?
It is generally conceded that the principle involved in the first
question comes within the purview of the decision of the court in the
Insular Cases and the Hawaiian case.t In order to support the
proposition that the right of trial by jury is in the Philippines, it
must be held that the Constitution in its entirety has been in its full
force and effect in the Philippines since the date of the ratification
of the treaty of Paris, and hence the provision guaranteeing the
right of trial by jury has existed in the islands since that date.
The Supreme Court held in the insular cases that exactly the
* Thomas E. Kepner v. United States; Fred L. Door and Edward F.
O'Brien v. United States; Secundino Mendezona Y Mendezona v. United
States.
tHawaii v. Mankichi, i9O U. S. i97.
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contrary of the foregoing proposition is the law. It said in those
cases that all of the provisions of the Constitution do not of their
own force attach to newly acquired territory immediately upon the
date of acquisition; that the power to extend the provisions of the
Constitution to the territories rests with Congress. And, notwith-
standing the fact that there are certain prohibitions contained in the
Constitution relating to natural or fundamental rights which go to
the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, at all times, in
all places, and under all circumstances, yet there are other limitations
contained in that instrument, not absolute in their nature, relating
to artificial rights, such as methods of procedure, forms of judicial
trial, and modes of taxation, which do not restrict Congress in the
exercise of its power to create local government and make needful
rules and regulations for the territory of the United States. In
view of these decisions, the only practical question left for deter-
niination in cases coming from our insular possessions 'involving
constitutional questions is, What are natural or fundamental rights,
and what are artificial or remedial rights? The question here pre-
sented is, Is the right of trial by jury fundamental? The Supreme
Court has answered this question in the case of Hawaii v. Mankichi,
as follows:
We would even go farther, and say that most, if not all,
the privileges and immunities contained in the bill of rights of
the Constitution were intended to apply from the moment of
annexation; but we place our decision of this case upon the
ground that the two rights alleged to be violated in this case*
are not fundamental in their nature, but concern merely a
method of procedure which sixty years of practice had shown
to be suited to the conditions of the islands, and well calculated
to conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their prop-
erty, and their well being.
In the light of this decision of the court it would appear that the
answer to the first question involved in the Philippine cases will not
be attended with much difficulty. This, however, cannot be said of
the second question.
The second point raised is, Does the Philippine Government act,
which provides that no person "for the same offense shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment," repeal the Code of Criminal Pro-
* Common law trial by jury and indictment by grand jury.
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cedure* of the Philippines, which gives the government, as well as
the accused, the right of appeal from judgments of the trial court
in criminal cases? At first blush it would appear that the law
giving the Government the right of appeal in criminal cases is a
clear violation of the act of Congress, but an investigation of the
Spanish law on the subject of "double jeopardy" and the rules of
statutory interpretation discloses the fact that there is much to be
said on both sides of the question. The principle that a person shall
not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is as firmly
imbedded in the Spanish law as it is in the law of the United
States. In the Roman law, upon which the Spanish law is based,
the principle non bs in idem, is clearly laid down. Bouvier, in
speaking of this phrase, says it signifies that no one shall be twice
tried for the same offens---that is, when a party accused has been
once tried by a tribunal of the\last resort, and there convicted or
acquitted, he shall not be tried again.
Merlin and Bouvier cite the following provision of the Code
of Justinian, which is also referred to by the court of cassation of
France as the basis of the doctrine of jeopardy :t
He who has been accused of a crime can not be complained
of for the same offense by another person. But if more than
one offense arise from the same act and the offender has been
*The Code of Criminal Procedure in force in the Philippines at the
present time is General Order 58, which was issued by the military governor
during the military occupation of the islands. The clause with reference to
appeals is substantially a continuation of the old practice under the Spanish
Code of Procedure. Sections 43 and 44 are as follows:
Sec. 43. From all final judgments of the courts of first instance of
similar jurisdiction and in all cases in which the law now provides for
appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the supreme court,
as hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall also lie from final judgments of
justices of the peace in criminal cases to the courts of the next superior
grade, and the decisions of the latter thereon shall be final and conclusive,
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute,
wherein appeal may be made to the supreme court.
Sec. 44. Either party may appeal from a final judgment or from an
order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant,
or in any case now permitted by law. The United States may also appeal
from a judgment for the defendant rendered on a demurrer to an in-
formation or complaint and from an order dismissing a complaint or
information.
tSee Devilleneuve and Gilbert's Table ginrale alplabetique du Recueil
giniral des lois et des arrets, vol. 3, P. 399.
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accused of one offense, it is not prohibited that complaint be
made against him by another person for the other offense.
Code, lib. ix, tit. ii, 1. 9.
This principle continued to be recognized in French law, was
made a part of the constitution of 1791, of the constitution of
the year III, of the code of 3 Brumaire, year IV, and, finally, of
the Napoleonic "code d'instruction criminalle," which declares:
Art. 360. No person legally acquitted can be a second time
arrested or accused by reason of the same act.
In Spanish law the doctrine found expression in the Fuero Real
(A. D. 1255), and the Siete Partidas (A. D. 1263):
After a man accused of any crime has been acquitted by
the court, no one can afterwards accuse him of the same offense
(except in certain specified cases). Fuero Real, lib. iv, tit. xxi,
1. 13.
If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any offense
of which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards
accuse him of that offense (except in certain cases). Siete
Partidas, Part VII, tit. i, 1. xii.
In the encyclopedia of Spanish law, published by Don Lorenzo
Arrazola, in 1848, it is said, in considering the persons who may be
accused of crime:
It is another of the general exceptions that a person cannot
be accused who has formerly been accused and adjudged of
the said crime; since the most essential effect of all judicial
decisions upon which execution can issue is to constitute un-
alterable law. Tomo I, pag. 511.
The difference in the rules of law relating to double jeopardy
as they exist in the Roman system, and in the common law, is one
of application merely, ,and arises out of the difference between the
common law and the civil law conceptions of what constitutes a trial.
Broadly speaking, under the American law jeopardy ends with
the conclusion of a trial by a jury. Under the Spanish system
jeopardy ends when the case has been heard by the Supreme Court
on appeal and the latter has rendered a final judgment. Under the
Spanish system there is no jury trial and the judgment of the trial
court is but little more than advisory. It may be modified, set aside,
or reversed on appeal. It is not an uncommon occurrence for the
supreme court to increase the punishment of persons who have been
convicted by the lower court, and it often convicts persons who have
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been acquitted by the trial court. But when this is done the jeopardy
ends. There is no reviewing the case after the supreme court has
passed upon it. Until recently, cases went to the supreme court
as a matter of law, no appeal being necessary. But this has been
modified to the extent of making the judgments of the court of first
instance final, unless an appeal is taken by the attorney-general or
the accused within twenty days. It is thus seen that, under the
law, there is no real finality of judgment until both tribunals have
passed upon the case. The review of the case by the supreme court
is a part of one continuous trial.
It is contended, on the one hand, that the controlling guide in
determining the intent with which Congress enacted the law in
question must be found in the interpretation which the language,
as used in the statute, has received at common law, and the meaning
it has in the Constitution of the United States. The Government
sets up as the guiding rule of interpretation in this case the funda-
mental presumption of law that the legislature is always presumed
to have had former statutes before it, to have been acquainted with
their judicial construction, and to have passed new statutes on the
same subjects with reference thereto. All statutes in pari rnateria
are to be considered together.
It is further pointed out that Congress was here dealing with
a new and unique subject matter. It knew that the Philippine
Islands were at the time of the passage of the act governed by a
system of laws separate and distinct from our own; that the princi-
ples of the civil law prevailed in all Spanish countries and under
that system of jurisprudence the right of trial by jury did not
exist. It knew also that the Spanish law on the subject of jury
trial and jeopardy had been re-enacted by the military governor
of the Philippines. Congress is also presumed to have known that
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has uniformly held,
since American occupation, that jeopardy, according to the Spanish
law in force in the islands, does not end until the case has been
reviewed by the Supreme Court, and final judgment rendered by
that tribunal. The foregoing proposition was supplemented by the
following contention, upon which counsel for the government laid
much emphasis. The conception of double jeopardy as it exists in
England and the United States is indissolubly connected with the
system of jury trial, and Congress, in withholding the jury system
from the Philippines, also meant to change the application of the
auxiliary principle of jeopardy. If Congress had extended the
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system of trial by jury to the Philippines, then the contention of
the plaintiffs in error in the cases would have been unassailable.
The whole Anglo-Saxon rule of procedure, criminal and civil, is
based upon the provision for trial by jury. The omission of the
provision for jury trial renders other principles of common law
procedure incident thereto, inappropriate. Common law proceed-
ings without jury trial would be like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet
left out. Under the common law the jury is the supreme authority,
and when they have completed their work one jeopardy is over, viz.,
the jeopardy of conviction by that particular jury. A second jury
would involve a second jeopardy, for one jury might convict where
another would acquit. This position is sound-otherwise the State
might go on experimenting until it found a jury ready and willing
to convict. Under the Spanish law, as it exists in the Philippines,
however, all of this is inapplicable. No person or body has a right
to render a verdict, except the courts.
There is no judgment or verdict rendered by a body which then
forever passes out of existence. The inferior and superior courts
of the Philippine Islands are merely parts of one general judicial
system. The connection between these courts is far closer than it
possibly can be under a jury system. The proceedings in the upper
and lower courts are merely parts of the same judicial trial. The
proceeding in the lower court is but one step in the case; the rights
of the accused cannot be determined therein, either favorably or
adversely. There is but one trial, which can not be terminated until
the decision of the supreme court is finally given, and there is but
one putting in jeoPardy. In the Philippine Islands the Supreme
Court itself renders the verdict; under the common law procedure
all the court can do is to order a new trial by a new jury, and in
this connection it is to be noted that the Supreme Court in the
Philippine Islands has no original or concurrent jurisdiction to
hear and try criminal cases in the first instance; its jurisdiction is
only appellate; hence there can be no new trial in any proper sense
of the term.
A comparison of the common law and Spanish law rules with
reference to "double jeopardy" discloses, first, that the principle
embodied in the doctrine against "double jeopardy" is identical in
both systems; the difference being one of application only; second,
that the Spanish law application of the principle is supported by
reason and justice, as well as the one found in the common law,
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and is well calculated to conserve the rights and well being of the
citizens of the Philippine Islands.
The Spanish law application of the principle is based upon the
theory that the state has just as much right and just as much
interest in having the errors of the trial court corrected by the
appellate court as has the accused, and the further proposition that,
under the judicial system as it exists in the Philippines, such a
procedure results in no injury to the accused.
The common law application of the principle of jeopardy grew
out of a state of affairs in England which has had no parallel in
the history of this country. The application of the principle as
it is found in the common law was a natural and necessary auxiliary
of the system of trial by jury and was designed to defeat the
corrupt administration of the sovereign, who had come to use the
courts for the accomplishment of his own personal ends, rather
than for the purposes of justice. The system of trial by jury was
of no avail to defeat the aggressions and usurpations of the crown,
if the verdict of the twelve men had been committed to the judgment
of a pliant judiciary appointed to execute the sovereign will. In
this state of things it became necessary to make jeopardy end with
the verdict of the jury, and so it was incorporated into the law.
From this fact, and from the dicta of certain judges, the idea has
grown up that a trial ends because the accused has once been placed
in jeopardy. The truth is, the trial was declared. to be at an end
in order to defeat the purposes of a tyrannical sovereign.
A trial does not end because one has been in jeopardy, but
jeopardy ends because there has been a legal and valid trial. The
whole proposition turns upon what constitutes a trial, and that is a
matter of statute and of judicial interpretation. The conditions out
of which the common-law rule sprang having passed away, there is
no good reason why the rule itself should not yield to modification.
The maxim that no one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense is universal, and is based upon the principle found
in all systems of jurisprudence, viz., the necessity for finality of
judicial proceedings.
The principle of finality is an essential, but it is not more
essential than the principle of justice. A final settlement is not
more vital than a right settlement. The accused has a natural right
to be exempt from a second trial after the first has been wholly
concluded, but he has no right to determine what shall constitute a
trial; this is determined by considerations of public policy in each
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jurisdiction and is not a fundamental principle found in any system
of jurisprudence.
It needs no argument to . . . demonstrate that the
natural rights of the individual, as well as the interests of public
order, are best served, and the essential principles of juris-
prudence are most accurately followed, when the proceedings
in a criminal prosecution include such protection against injus-
tice that the final disposition of the cause will not only settle
the controversy but settle it in accordance with law. Judicious
legislation for securing a full, fair, legal trial of each criminal
cause is not in derogation, but in protection of individual right,
and is in full accord with the principle that no man shall twice
be put in jeopardy for the same offense. That maxim, as we
have seen, is based on the truth that a judicial proceeding law-
fully carried on to its conclusion by a final judgment puts the
seal of finality on the controversies determined by that judgment,
and is not based on a theory that a person accused of crime
has any natural right of exemption from those regulations of
a judicial proceeding which the state deems necessary to make
sure that the conduct and final result of that proceeding shall
be in accordance with law. And so the "putting in jeopardy"
means a jeopardy which is real, and has continued through every
stage of one prosecution, as fixed by existing laws relating to
procedure. (State v. Lee, 27 L. R. A., 499.)
If the accused has been erroneously acquitted by a trial court
he has never been in real jeopardy. If there has been no vital
error at nisi prins, an appeal from such a judgment of acquittal
must needs be unsuccessful and the prisoner can not suffer thereby.
If, on the other hand, the judgment is reversible, and the defendant
is likely to be prejudiced by the appeal, it must necessarily be
because of some error at first instance which made his trial abortive
and made his jeopardy an apparent instead of a real one.
When the state sees proper to provide that the cause shall not
necessarily be ended with the judgment of the trial court, but that
further proceedings, on motion of the accused, may be had, an
unjust verdict resumes its normal position of a legal nullity, and
when the state provides for like proceedings on the motion of the
prosecutor a similar result must follow.
The proposition was clearly stated in the case of State v. Garvey,
42 Conn., 243, when the court said:
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The principle which protects an individual from the jeopardy
involved in a second trial for the same offense is well established
and fully recognized. The question, however, as to what con-
stitutes a trial depends upon the course of procedure of the
particular jurisdiction in which it is had, and the construction
of the courts there with respect to it.
It is thus seen that a law permitting an appeal on the part of
the state from a judgment of acquittal in the trial court and requiring
the final verdict of the court to be reached in accordance with the
settled principles of law and justice before it can support a valid
judgment is not in derogation of any fundamental doctrine of the
common law, or inconsistent with the principle found in all systems
of jurisprudence, or of the Constitution, or in violation of any
principle of original justice that supports and enforces the con-
clusiveness of a valid, final judgment.
The above-mentioned Philippine cases in which these questions
are involved will likely be decided during the present term of
the Supreme Court of the United States. The announcement will
be watched with interest by the Philippine people and all who are
responsible for the administration of the Archipelago.
Lebbeus R. Wifley,
Washington, D. C., May 4, i9o4.
